A central task of the leadership of any organization is the choice of its successors and subordinates. The effort and contentiousness which often go into this process suggests that it has important consequences for the organization. Our objective here is to examine how the centralization or decentralization of decision-making authority affects the quality of managers who are actually selected. This question is naturally dynamic because the quality of current managers is not only influenced by that of past managers, but it, in turn, affects the quality of future managers.
A central task of the leadership of any organization is the choice of its successors and subordinates. Corporate presidents spend a significant part of their time selecting upper management. Tenured faculty sometimes spends months deciding whether particular individuals should be admitted into their ranks. The effort and contentiousness which often go into this process suggests that it has important consequences for the organization. It is recognized that there are large differences in individuals' abilities and that the abilities of those in leadership inevitably affect the performance and survival of the organization.
Our objective here is to examine how the centralization or decentralization of decision-making authority affects the quality of the managers who are actually selected. This question is naturally dynamic because the quality of current managers is not only influenced by that of past managers, but it, in turn, affects the quality of future managers.
We consider stylized economies consisting of an arbitrary number of hierarchies (organizations) of different sizes. The size of a hierarchy is the number of managers within the hierarchy, one of whom is the hierarch (the boss) and others are subordinates. The current hierarch appoints his own successor and those of his subordinates, but has no influence on any other hierarchy. (This assumption exaggerates somewhat the typical asymmetry of authority between the hierarch and the subordinates.) Our definition of a "more" or "less" centralized economy is intuitive: an economy is more centralized if it has a larger proportion of the total number of managers in larger hierarchies.
Our main result is that there is a greater variability (over time) in the steady-state quality of managers in a more centralized economy. This is because highly capable decision-makers have greater beneficial effects on the managerial choices in a more centralized economy. By the same token, highly incapable managers placed in the same positions have greater deleterious effects. 
I. MANAGERIAL QUALITY
There are two types of managers: those with high and those with low abilities to select managers; they are referred to as "good" and "bad" managers, respectively. If a high-ability manager selects a future manager, he (she) will select a high-ability manager with probability q1, and a low-ability manager with probability 1 -q1. The corresponding probabilities for a low-ability manager are q2 and 1 -q2. We assume that 1 > q1 > q2 > 0; that is, while neither type of manager is perfect, each type has some ability to select high-ability managers. The derivation of (4) is highly intuitive. The succession process depends critically on the hierarch because the subordinates do not influence it. z1 is the (steady-state) probability that the hierarch is a good manager, and Z2 is the probability that the hierarch is a bad manager.2 Further, the binomial density b(m,M,ql) is the probability that m good managers are chosen when the hierarch is good, and b(mM,q2) is the corresponding probability when the hierarch is bad. Straightforward combination of these probabilities yields (4). To analyze the economy s as a whole, let A(s) and V(s), respectively, denote the mean and the variance of the number of 2. In the steady state, z1 = zjqj + z2q2, because q1 is the probability of selecting a good manager as the next period's hierarch if the current hierarch is good, whereas q2 is the corresponding probability if the current hierarch is bad. Using Z2 = 1 -Z1, the preceding expression yields (5). good managers in this economy. Since the mean or the variance of a sum of independent random variables is the sum of their respective means or variances, (2) and (6) yield (7) 4. This approach was suggested by a referee.
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II. MANAGERIAL OUTPUT
The relationship between the quality of managers and the output or the performance of an organization is complicated. It depends not only on the distribution of ability and on the tasks that managers perform, but also on the positive and negative externalities that good and bad managers exert on one another. In this section we examine these aspects using the simple model, described in a part of the last section, in which there are only two managers in the decentralized as well as in the centralized economy.
First, consider the case where the expected output of both economies is the same if they have the same number of good managers. Then, from the observation made earlier that the distribution of the number of good managers in the centralized economy is a mean-preserving spread of the corresponding distribution in the decentralized economy, it follows that the output in the centralized economy is smaller than that in the decentralized economy if the output is concave in the number of good managers. The opposite is the case if the output is convex in the number of good managers.
The relative performance of the centralized economy is further weakened if the comparison is based not on the expected output but on the expected utility of the output, and if the utility displays some risk aversion. In fact, even when output is convex in the number of good managers, if the utility is sufficiently concave in output, the expected utility will be higher in the decentralized economy.
In the rest of this section we analyze a specific example with explicit managerial tasks. Managers select projects and future managers. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of projects: good projects, yielding an (expected net) profit x; and bad projects, yielding a profit -x. Half the projects are good; half are bad. Bad managers are assumed not to have discriminating ability; they randomly accept a fraction p2 of the projects. Good managers are better at choosing future managers as well as projects; they accept a good project with probability p1 and a bad project with probability p', where p' > P2 > p'. The fraction of projects that a good manager accepts isp1 (p1 + p')/2. In economy s' a project is accepted only if both managers accept it. In contrast, in economy s a project is accepted if either of the two independent managers accept it. Thus, the "decentralized" economy is more decentralized in the selection of successors as well 5. We have assumed here that the centralization of decision-making authority in one dimension is correlated with that in another dimension.
6. In the expressions for the Y's, we suppress a constant, Tx (p -p')/2, where T is the number of available projects. It is assumed that, in economy s, half of the projects initially go to each of the two managers, that those rejected by one manager go to the other, and that the same project is not reviewed more than once by each manager. Thus, for example, when economy s has two good managers, the acceptance probabilities for a good project and a bad project are, respectively, p1(2 -pt) and p2(2 _ p2). The profit is Y(2 Is) = Tx[p1 (2 -p1) -p2(2 -p2)]/2, which is reexpressed as in (13).
